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Summary. During the 1970s the National Association for Mental Health (NAMH) re-labelled itself
MIND, becoming a rights-based organisation, critiquing psychiatry and emphasising patients’ citi-
zenship. Its transformation has been coloured by attributions of the influence of anti-psychiatry.
This article argues that the relevance of anti-psychiatry has been over-simplified. It examines
MIND’s history as part of the psychiatric strategy known as mental hygiene. This movement’s
agenda can be understood as paradigmatic of much that anti-psychiatry renounced. However,
building on the sociologist Nick Crossley’s description of the interactional nature of Social
Movement Organisations in the psychiatric field, this article shows that a ‘discursive transformation’
can be deduced in core elements of mental hygienist thinking. This transformation of discourse
clearly prefigured important elements of anti-psychiatry, and also fed into MIND’s rights approach.
But it must be appreciated on its own terms. Its distinctiveness under MIND is shown in its applica-
tion to people with learning disabilities.
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In 1970 the British mental health charity, the National Association for Mental Health
(NAMH) announced a radical change of emphasis. NAMH was the leading charity organi-
sation working in mental health at that time. It had been founded in 1946 as a major
embodiment of what was known as the movement for mental hygiene, and an amalgam-
ation of three of the movement’s constituent organisations whose origins stretched back
into the early decades of the twentieth century. By the end of the 1960s, however,
NAMH had acquired a staid image as a ‘twin-set-and-pearls’ establishment organisation
working in close alliance with psychiatrists and the government. During the 1960s it had
increasingly struggled to respond to rapid social change. Added to this a series of hospital
scandals broke around this time, contributing to a sense of crisis in the psychiatric system.
NAMH responded by rebranding itself MIND and adopting the role of a consumer ori-
ented organisation using rights-based terminology.1 Critiques of MIND’s activity during
the 1970s and 1980s highlighted anti-psychiatry as an important influence and this has
strongly influenced historiographical understanding. This article contends that the effect
has been to occlude a fuller appreciation of transformations associated with the mental
hygiene movement. Using newly available material, I build on my own work on the
mental hygiene movement and combine this with the sociologist Nick Crossley’s analysis
Jonathan Toms is an Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of History at the University of East Anglia.
*School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, Norfolk, UK. E-mail: jonathon.
toms@ntlworld.com.
1NAMH, Annual Reports 1969/70, 1971/72, 1973/74.
Wellcome Trust Archives and Manuscripts, Mind
Archives: SA/MIN/B/80/7/3 Although most often
written in capitals the title MIND is not an acronym,
nor did it replace the organisation’s official title.
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for the Social History of Medicine.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creative
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
doi:10.1093/shm/hky096
Social History of Medicine Vol. 00, No. 0 pp. 1–19 Dow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/shm
/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/shm
/hky096/5187392 by U
niversity of East Anglia user on 07 D
ecem
ber 2018
of social movement organisations (SMOs) in mental health, in order to reveal important
themes that have been obscured.2
Delineations of anti-psychiatry have been diffuse. Yet, in their attribution to MIND,
these delineations have commonly resolved into the view that MIND naively accepted
anti-psychiatry’s debunking claims (along with the most radical versions of sociological
‘labelling’ theory), concluded that ‘mental illness does not exist’, and simply saw decar-
ceration from psychiatric hospitals as the solution.3 It would be hard to deny that anti-
psychiatry had some influence on MIND. For example, leading figures were especially
influenced by Erving Goffman as well as the Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia’s radical
alternative to mental hospitals.4 However, MIND did not deny the existence of mental ill-
ness, nor did it envisage decarceration as a straightforward solution to people’s troubles.
Indeed during the late 1960s NAMH came under sustained attack from another strand of
anti-psychiatry, the Church of Scientology, whose Citizens Commission on Human Rights
was founded with Thomas Szasz. This conflict continued with MIND.5 On the other
hand, MIND was supportive of the Mental Patients Union (MPU) which was set up in
1973 and was strongly influenced by anti-psychiatry, as well as Marxist thinking. MIND
gave space in its magazine MIND OUT for MPU news and views. But it soon came under
criticism from elements of the MPU and associated groups who considered it to be insuf-
ficiently representative of service users.6
The impact of anti-psychiatry is therefore complex. Its relevance to MIND and the men-
tal hygiene movement, I argue, lies elsewhere, in its ideological underpinnings and core
features. In his The Deviant Imagination, Geoffrey Pearson provided an early and sophisti-
cated attempt, to unpack its assumptions and imperatives. He noted that:
One of the most important, if not the most important, developments in the field of
deviance has been the ‘medicalisation’ and ‘psychiatricisation’ of social problems:
crime, it is said, is an illness; youthful unrest is a maturational phase; political dissent
is the result of personality quirks of ‘mindless militants’; a poor employment record
flows from a disorder of character; poor families, or ‘problem families’ are low on
something called ‘interpersonal maturity’. Some critics will say that the worst thing
to happen to deviance theory was medicine.7
2Jonathan Toms, Mental Hygiene and Psychiatry in
Modern Britain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013);
Nick Crossley, Contesting Psychiatry: Social
Movements in Mental Health (London: Routledge,
2006). I also make reference to some of Crossley’s as-
sociated articles.
3Peter Sedgwick, Psychopolitics (London, Pluto Press,
1982), 214–15; Nikolas Rose, ‘Unreasonable Rights:
Mental Illness and the Limits of the Law’, Journal of
Law and Society, 1985, 12, 199–218. This was ex-
tended and amended as, ‘Law, Rights and Psychiatry’,
in Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, The Power of
Psychiatry (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), 177–213.
4Lawrence O. Gostin, ‘From a Civil Libertarian to a
Sanitarian’, Journal of Law and Society, 2007, 34,
594–616, 596–99.
5C. H. Rolph, Believe What You Like: What Happened
between the Scientologists and the National
Association for Mental Health (London: Deustch,
1973); NAMH, Annual Report 1969–70. SA/MIN/B/
80/7/2; Council of Management Minutes throughout
1967–1972. SA/MIN/A/3/1-3. For an overview of anti-
psychiatry that includes Scientology, see for example,
Nimesh G. Desai, ‘Antipsychiatry: Meeting the
Challenge’, Indian Journal of Psychiatry, 2005, 47,
185–7.
6See Andrew Roberts’ site: <http://studymore.org.uk/
mpu#MindandMPU> (accessed on 24 October 2018).
7Geoffrey Pearson, The Deviant Imagination:
Psychiatry, Social Work and Social Change (London,
Macmillan, 1975), 15.
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For Pearson, anti-psychiatry offered a ‘politics of socialisation’ that exposed how under
urban-industrial society ‘the requirements of normality, conformity and reasonableness—
in a word “mental health”’ distorted human consciousness. Anti-psychiatry emphasised
human freedom and choice, at the same time as it problematised authority and coercion.
Its alternative programme has been summarised by Digby Tantam: ‘Overcoming alien-
ation by means of alternative therapy, self-help, the abolition of the distinction between
professional and patient, and the levelling of hierarchy . . .’.8
This article is divided into three sections. In the first, I summarise Nick Crossley’s rendi-
tion of the trajectory of the mental hygiene movement and the impact of anti-psychiatry.
In the next, I offer my own description of the mental hygiene movement and NAMH.
This largely supports Crossley’s, but draws attention to certain significant omissions and
aims to deepen the analysis. In the third section, however, I explain how leading princi-
ples of mental hygienist therapeutic theory manifested a ‘discursive transformation’.
These can be understood as prefigurative of important elements in anti-psychiatry, but
they must also, I argue, be recognised as offering a distinct conceptualisation of mental
health and ‘disorder’. In the final section I show how these principles were brought into
an unstable coalition with wider elements of social critique under MIND.
Crossley’s Schema in Relation to the Mental Hygiene Movement,
and Anti-Psychiatry
Crossley’s analysis of post-war SMOs focused on their dynamic and interactional relation,
and the importance of discursive formation, diffusion and transformation.9 It recognised
the importance of the mental hygiene movement, as well as that of anti-psychiatry and
civil rights.
Crossley noted that the mental hygiene movement emerged in Britain between the
two World Wars and remained an important institutionalised movement throughout the
post-war years until the turn of the 1970s.10 He focused on NAMH, and its interwar pre-
cursor bodies: the Central Association for Mental Welfare (CAMW), the National Council
for Mental Hygiene (NCMH) and the Child Guidance Council (CGC). For Crossley the
mental hygiene movement could be characterised as both ‘progressive’ and ‘conserva-
tive’. In his view the discourse of mental hygiene, advocated by NAMH and its predeces-
sors expressed a middle-class bias along with associated moral and gender biases that
‘tended to preclude the possibility of debate (and thus democracy in psychiatry) by virtue
of their appeal to a realm of pre-established scientific fact’.11 By this, Crossley appears to
mean the restriction of debate within the field of psychiatry.
But for Crossley the mental hygiene movement also expressed a ‘progressive’ aspect.
He noted, for instance, that the mental hygiene movement placed a greater focus on
‘environmentalism’ challenging the attribution of mental disorders exclusively to organic
8Digby Tantam, ‘The Anti-Psychiatry Movement’, in
German E. Berrios and Hugh Freeman, eds, 150
Years of Psychiatry, 1841–1991 (London: Gaskell,
1991), 333–47, at 344.
9Crossley, Contesting Psychiatry, 16 and 45.
10As Crossley notes, it originated in the United States
during the first decade of the twentieth century. See
also, for example, Theresa R. Richardson, The
Century of the Child: The Mental Hygiene Movement
and Social Policy in the United States and Canada
(New York: State University Press, 1989).
11Crossley, ‘Transforming the Mental Health Field: The
Early History of the National Association for Mental
Health’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 1998, 20,
458–88, 484.
Discursive Transformation 3 Dow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/shm
/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/shm
/hky096/5187392 by U
niversity of East Anglia user on 07 D
ecem
ber 2018
causes, common among British psychiatrists. This is a shift that was particularly related to
psychiatrists’ and psychologists’ experience of the Great War.12 However, Crossley’s
main emphasis was on the movement’s switch in emphasis from the terminology of
‘sanity’ and ‘insanity’ to ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’. It promoted the full develop-
ment of personality in the name of ‘mental health’ and this involved a nationally organ-
ised system of education, detection and early treatment. In the process, the movement
sought a shift away from ‘the old asylum system with its punitive, poor law associations’
to a service oriented towards the community, out-patients’ clinics and child guidance
services.13 Inherent in this was the promotion of associated professions of child psychia-
try, psychology and psychiatric social work.
Crossley convincingly argues that while the mental hygiene movement’s ‘goal of
improving mental health and reorienting services away from illness towards health’ was
not fully accepted in psychiatry, or wider society, it nevertheless amounted to a ‘para-
digm shift’. The mental hygiene movement shifted the overall conceptualisation and ori-
entation of the psychiatric system.14 From the interwar period, the government accepted
the mental hygienist call for early treatment and the associated need for attitudinal
changes in the wider public.15
However, one of the ironic effects was to contribute both to an ‘elevation of expecta-
tions’ that remained unmet, and a wider questioning and debate about the psychiatric
system. In Crossley’s terminology, this created ‘strain’ within the ‘psychiatric field of
contestation’ and encouraged the emergence and engagement of other SMOs within
the psychiatric field of contention; first the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL)
during the 1950s, and later an ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement.16
The NCCL was the earliest post-war SMO to enter the field in antagonism with psychi-
atry and the mental hygiene movement. Crossley notes that the well-established civil
rights discourse provided the organisation, mobilisation and ‘discursive elaboration’ re-
quired to turn ‘strain’ within the field of psychiatric contestation into active campaigning
for reform.17 NAMH adopted a ‘conservative’ stance, ‘reducing critique to ignorance’ of
psychiatric expertise.18 Crossley claims that ‘there was little that was new in these
debates’ but that the later anti-psychiatry movement set in train a ‘paradigm shift in the
wider campaigning culture’. After anti-psychiatry ‘nobody could carry on as before’.19
The mental hygiene discourse appeared outmoded. NAMH could not shift its stance to
the extent of adopting the agenda of anti-psychiatry. Instead it ‘embraced a civil rights
discourse’.20
Mental Hygiene: ‘Adjustment’, ‘Familial Relations’ and Democracy
As Crossley argues, the mental hygiene discourse grounded its agenda on a claim to
established scientific fact. Through this, it foreclosed debate and therefore ruled out
‘democracy in psychiatry’. This contention needs, however, to be explicitly integrated
12See, for example, Peter Barham, Forgotten Lunatics
of the Great War (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2004), ch. 8, 150–64.
13Crossley, Contesting Psychiatry, 90.
14Ibid., 75; Crossley, ‘Transforming the Mental Health
Field’, 470.
15Crossley, Contesting Psychiatry, 75.
16Ibid., 94, 97.
17Ibid., 94.
18Ibid., 98.
19Ibid., 96, 122–3.
20Ibid., 136, 138– -9.
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with the fact that the mental hygienist agenda also actively operated against any wider
advocacy of egalitarian participatory democracy in society. The mental hygienist theorisa-
tion of the need for ‘mental adjustment’ and associated attention to familial authority
relations appears central to this aspect of the mental hygiene discourse. I elaborate this
below.
Two interacting theoretical discourses can be isolated as primarily informing the move-
ment when it became institutionally established in Britain between the wars: a theory of
instincts drawn from ‘the new psychology’ of the early twentieth century,21 and psycho-
analysis along with its various popular reformulations. The first emphasised that primitive
instincts and their accompanying emotions were basic impulses of human behaviour.22
The second attended to unconscious motivations within the mind. In combination these
theories propounded the need to deal with the emotional aspects of the mind. Emotions
underlay humans’ dynamic growth and ‘adjustment’. They could not simply be sup-
pressed. The ability to understand how emotional experience was a necessary compo-
nent of mental development was conceived as rational, scientific and more humane. The
mental hygiene movement explicitly promulgated its scientific credentials. As the psychol-
ogist Cyril Burt, a member of the NCMH, stated it in an early 1930s radio broadcast:
Modern civilization is based upon science; and it is our belief that, if that civilization
is to continue, scientific thinking must be applied to man as well as to inanimate na-
ture. The methods that have revolutionised agriculture, industry, medicine and war,
must be adopted for the study of ourselves—of the individual, the family, the na-
tion and the race.23
Such a scientific approach was considered, by definition, to combine the potential for
greater human happiness and greater societal efficiency. The aim was that a person
should ‘learn how to govern his instincts so as to avoid conflict in his own mind and con-
flict with his neighbours’.24 While contemporary Western society was, for mental hygien-
ists, a manifestation of progress, it also carried with it possibilities of destabilisation and
even regression. Mental hygienists concerned themselves with societal cooperation and
regulation in the face of concerns about the effects of industrialisation, commercialisa-
tion, increasing urbanisation and the emergence of popular politics. But while mental
hygienists recognised the stress and complex social pressures that modernity had brought
with it, their main focus was on some people’s failure, as they saw it, to adjust to these
appropriately.25
21John Dewey, ‘The New Psychology’, Andover
Review, 1884, 2, 278–89. Accessed at <http://psy
chclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/newpsych.htm>
(accessed on 24 October 2018); G. Stanley Hall, ‘The
New Psychology’, Andover Review, 1885, 3, 120–35.
Accessed at <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Hall/new
psych.htm> (accessed on 24 October 2018); William
McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology
(London: Methuen & Co., 1908).
22J. R. Rees, The Health of the Mind (London: Faber &
Faber, 1929); Cyril Burt, Introduction to William
McDougall, Psychology: The Study of Behaviour
(London: Oxford University Press, 1952).
23Cyril Burt, Preface to Cyril Burt, ed., How The Mind
Works, 2nd edn (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1945 [1933]), 7.
24Letitia Fairfield, ‘Crime and Punishment’, Mental
Hygiene, 1931, 4, 17–20, 18. SA/MIN/B/80/30/1.
25J. Burnett Rae, ‘Psychotherapy: Its Place and
Implications’, Mental Hygiene Bulletin, 1931, 3, 1–7,
at 3. SA/MIN/B/80/45; Rt. Hon. Sir Lesley Scott,
Chairman’s introduction to discussion on, ‘The
Proper Care of Defectives Outside Institutions’ in
Central Association for Mental Welfare, Report of a
Conference on Mental Welfare Held in the Central
Hall, Westminster, London, SW on Thursday and
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Mental hygienists were concerned to avoid rampant egoists or atomistic individuals on
the one hand, and suggestible sheep following the herd on the other.26 Adequate adjust-
ment required an acceptable balance between these two ‘maladjusted’ extremes.
A main support for this was the movement’s conceptualisation of ‘mental deficiency’.
Along with certain categories of people certified insane, mental deficiency performed
the role of dramatically highlighting what mental hygienists saw as a substantial negative
hereditarian impact on social regulation, citizenship and social progress. As Hugh
Crichton Miller, the director of the Tavistock Clinic put it, ‘A hereditary deficiency of grey
matter makes a good adjustment impossible’.27 These people’s close association, by
mental hygienists, with an array of social problems, was coupled with representations
of them as either suggestible and easily lead, or egoistic and without restraint. For every-
body else, mental hygienists considered the preeminent locus of adjustment to lie in the
family.
In the early 1980s the sociologist David Armstrong provided an influential account of
how, in the early decades of the twentieth century, ‘the medical gaze’ shifted from locat-
ing disease in bodies and specific locations to tracking it in the interstices between bod-
ies. He detected an extension of this gaze to mental troubles, from around the Second
World War. ‘Mental instabilities’ began to be conceived as actually manifest in relation-
ships themselves.28 Reconfigured approaches along these lines, emerging in the disci-
pline of psychoanalysis, were particularly closely associated with mental hygiene. The
psychoanalyst Joseph Schwartz has described these as the beginnings of a ‘paradigm
shift’ in psychoanalysis. The classical understanding of an internal psyche seeking tension
reduction through the satisfaction of desires was transformed by the gradual elaboration
of a theory of personality conceived in terms of the need for human relationships.29
These transformations had wide ramifications. For example, Chris Millard has recently
traced them to a shift in the psychological conceptualisation and treatment of self-harm
in Britain.30
For mental hygienists the family lay at the root of social order and stability. Maurice
Craig, the President of the NCMH, wrote, ‘Mental hygiene has its beginning in the
home. Family life is the basis of all social order, and everything must be done to make the
units which compose it harmonious and stable’.31 The psychiatrist and mental hygienist,
R. D. Gillespie, wrote that, ‘the family environment is literally of immense importance for
psychopathology and the understanding of people whether as healthy beings or as mor-
bid, fearful, hysterical individuals’.32 Mental hygienists foregrounded, in particular here,
Friday, December the 2nd and 3rd, 1926 (London:
CAMW, 1926), 17–23, at 21–2.
26See, for instance, Hugh Crichton Miller, The New
Psychology and the Teacher (New York: Thomas
Seltzer, 1922).
27Hugh Crichton Miller, ‘Adaptation, Successful and
Unsuccessful’, Postgraduate Medical Journal, 1926,
1, 60–3, at 62.
28David Armstrong; Political Anatomy of the Body:
Medical Knowledge in Britain in the Twentieth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 59.
29Joseph Schwartz, Cassandra’s Daughter: A History of
Psychoanalysis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), 12.
30Chris Millard, A History of Self-Harm in Britain: A
Genealogy of Cutting and Overdosing (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). See especially, ch. 2, 62–
96.
31Maurice Craig, ‘Mental Hygiene in Everyday Life’,
Mental Hygiene, 1933, 7, 57–64, at 63. SA/MIN/B/
80/30, 58.
32R. D. Gillespie, ‘Mental Hygiene as a National
Problem’, Mental Hygiene, 1931, 4, 1–9, at 9. SA/
MIN/B/80/30.
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the importance of personal relationships of authority. It was through these that the
movement sought the development of a stable, integrated self, safely situated in a stable,
integrated, and yet progressive, society. Emanuel Miller, a leading psychoanalytic psychia-
trist in child guidance, wrote of the family’s intimate relations of authority that, ‘It is the
gentleness, the regularity and the firmness of these rules which give to the young human
being the first pattern of order and law’.33 A child needed to develop through personal
relations of authority without being made either ‘ultra-suggestible’ or ‘a rebel against all
authority’.34
Mental hygienists’ rendition of the modern individual was of someone who, through
adequate mental development, had become rationally marshalled, and was able to take
this balanced mental authority with them into the wider social order. Internally balanced
and adjusted, it would readily acquiesce in the modern authority relations necessary to
the balance and progress of wider society.
The mental hygiene agenda cut across notions of the body politic comprising a social
contract, and addressed both the extent and contents of citizenship.35 Mental hygienists’
concern for the progressive development of both individual minds and society entailed
more emphasis on a differentiation of social status and function according to mental abil-
ity and personality integration, and less emphasis on the coming together of equals
implied by the notion of a social contract. Many mental hygienists explicitly expounded
the need to accord social status with intellectual capacity.36 Some, such as Cyril Burt and
Hugh Crichton Miller explicitly questioned whether political democracy should be
amended on the basis of individuals’ intellectual capacity.37
Similarly, mental hygienists’ concentration on familial authority relations shaped, for
example, their attention to the problem of the ‘misfit’ in employment. They believed
vocational misfits could be the result of an intelligence or temperament wrongly placed,
or be the product of earlier faulty relations in the family creating emotional maladjust-
ments. The ‘misfit’ was closely associated with industrial problems. Implicitly focusing
attention on workers rather than employers, Maurice Craig, propounded that,
‘Maladjustments of individuals cause great social and industrial problems, and it is neces-
sary to understand these both in the interests of the manual worker and those who em-
ploy them’.38 Gillespie connected both the psychological interpretation of square pegs in
round holes and the conviction that mental maladjustment resulted from faulty authority
relations in the family, with ‘industrial problems’ and political dissent.
33Emanuel Miller, ‘The Mind of the Child’, Mental
Hygiene, 1933, 7, 68–71, at 68. SA/MIN/B/80/30
34For example, Miller, The New Psychology and the
Teacher, 36; Mary R Barkas, ‘Guilt’, Mental Hygiene,
1932, 6, 29–33, at 33. SA/MIN/B/80/30.
35Mathew Thomson, ‘Constituting Citizenship: Mental
Deficiency, Mental Health and Human Rights in
Inter-war Britain’, in Christopher Lawrence and
Anna-K. Meyer, eds, Regenerating England: Science,
Medicine and Culture in Inter-War Britain
(Amsterdam: Clio Medica, 2000), 231–50.
36For example, Maurice Craig, ‘Some Aspects of
Education and Training in Relation to Mental Disorder’,
Journal of Mental Science, 1922, 68, 209–28.
37Cyril Burt, ‘How the Mind Works in Society’, in Burt,
ed., How the Mind Works, 179–333, at 240–1 and
245; Hugh Crichton Miller, ‘Educational Ideals and
the Destinies of Peoples’, in J. A. Hadfield, ed.,
Psychology and Modern Problems (Plain View, New
York: Books for Libraries Press, 1973 [1935]), 131–
58, 151.
38Maurice Craig, ‘Mental Hygiene in Everyday Life’, 62.
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He wrote that,
from the collective aspect a group containing a large proportion of defective and
emotionally unstable persons is a menace to industrial peace. It has been shown
that even among normal people in employment who have monotonous tasks to
perform hour after hour, day after day, mental activity consists mainly in discon-
tented thoughts, rumination over supposed injustice regarding pay and promotion
and other conditions of work. A state of mind of this sort is fertile soil for the agita-
tor of political and economic discord.39
Likewise, other mental hygienists attributed industrial strikes to the consequences of
faulty parental authority among the working classes and similar reasoning was applied to
wider political conflict.40
Crossley maintains that mental hygienists’ claim to scientific authority foreclosed
debate and inhibited ‘democracy in psychiatry’. But, clearly as well, the intellectual and
class bias inherent in much mental hygienist theorising operated against democratic and
egalitarian claims within wider society. It is clear too, that this mental hygienist pro-
gramme was a forthright rendition of much that anti-psychiatry renounced.
Crossley maintains that there was nevertheless a ‘progressive’ aspect to the mental
hygiene agenda: its promotion of mental health and the early treatment of mental disor-
ders. Through this the movement influentially promoted changes to the form of psychiat-
ric organisation, with clinics and services based in, and oriented towards the community,
and the establishment of associated professions. Certainly, mental hygienists were suc-
cessful in gaining governmental support and Crossley’s assertion that the mental hygiene
movement’s agenda resulted in a paradigm shift is persuasive.
Mental hygienists succeeded in influencing the 1926 Royal Commission on Mental
Disorder to the extent that the objectives which informed the Commission were accepted
as public health, mental hygiene, national efficiency and social reconstruction.41 The key-
note of the future’, asserted the Commission, ‘should be prevention and treatment’.42
Yet the voluntary patient status that was proposed by the Commission (and enacted in
limited fashion under the 1930 Mental Health Act) was not intended as recognition of
the freedom of patients to decide whether to enter or leave hospital in their own inter-
ests. As Clive Unsworth noted, it served to reduce the penal character of entry to mental
hospital at the same time as it promoted a notion of social responsibility to submit to
public health measures necessary to the interests of the community as a whole.43 The
hope was to encourage people suffering mental stress to submit to early treatment.
Mental hygienists considered child guidance clinics central to providing comprehensive
mental hygiene for the community.44 Yet child guidance clinics discriminated against
39Gillespie, ‘Mental Hygiene as a National Problem’, 5.
40C. Flugel, The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family
(London: The International Psycho-analytical Press,
1921), 120; J. A. Hadfield, ‘Introduction’, in Hadfield,
ed., Psychology and Modern Problems, 14–15.
41See Clive Unsworth, The Politics of Mental Health
Legislation (London: Clarendon Press, 1987), 112–18.
42Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and
Mental Disorder (Cmd. 2700, 1926), para. 42.
43Unsworth, Politics of Mental Health, 169–70; Doris
Odlum, ‘The Meaning of the Mental Treatment Act,
1930’, Mental Hygiene Bulletin, 1931, 3, 8–12, at
11–12. SA/MIN/B/80/45.
44National Council for Mental Hygiene, Ninth Report of
the National Council for Mental Hygiene (London:
NCMH, 1932). SA/MIN/B/8O/55.
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treating children considered ‘mentally deficient’. A judgement that they were ‘deficient
in intelligence’ also deemed them unable to benefit from the psychological treatment
others received for emotional difficulties. Child guidance also commonly expressed a gen-
der bias. For example:
The mother is the centre-piece of the family when it is a matter of describing the
family neurosis, but it is to the father we must look when it comes to prognosis and
treatment. He more than anyone else will have an effective influence on his wife
and children if we can release his normal masculine impulses. He will then encour-
age what is normal in his wife, but even more important is the influence which he
will bring to bear directly on his children. He will make his daughter proud and
happy in her femininity and give his sons an example they can follow with pride.45
Nevertheless, as Crossley emphasises, the mental hygienist attempt to shift the form of
psychiatric organisation, from isolated mental hospitals to a nationally integrated system
that included child guidance and out-patient clinics, was significant among the ‘succes-
sive rounds of reform of psychiatry in the 1930s and 1950s’. He is surely right, as well,
that an unintended effect was to elevate expectations which remained unmet, and pro-
mote wider debate and criticism of the psychiatric system. This lead to the entry of the
National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) into the ‘psychiatric field’, and the later emer-
gence of ‘anti-psychiatry’.46
I concentrate in the next section, however, on how a ‘discursive transformation’ devel-
oped in the content of the forms of psychiatric organisation that the mental hygiene
movement promoted. The therapeutic principles developed by the mental hygiene move-
ment had, as we have seen, foregrounded the importance of familial relations of author-
ity. Within this they had prioritised emotional experience and expression as crucial
components of ‘mental adjustment’. Emotionality needed to be understood, nurtured
and accommodated in the interests of a concept of ‘mental health’ conceived in terms of
good citizenship and ‘social efficiency’. An important aspect of this nurture and develop-
ment was commonly referred to as a need for ‘emotional security’. I explain how an
understanding of the impact of this terminology enables an appreciation of the discursive
transformation that appears to have taken place at the level of therapeutic theory, and
(to a certain extent) practice.
Mental Hygienist Therapeutic Principles and ‘Discursive Transformation’
Speaking at a 1957 NAMH conference on ‘The Maladjusted Child’, the psychiatrist and
leading mental hygienist, Kenneth Soddy, told his audience that a doctor friend of his
had sent him a cutting from the ‘New Yorker’:
The picture shows a psychiatrist talking to the mother and very glum-looking child.
Underneath is the caption: ‘Mrs Minton, there’s no such thing as a bad boy. Hostile
perhaps. Aggressive, recalcitrant, destructive, even sadistic. But not bad.’47
45W. Paterson Brown, ‘The family neurosis’, in R. G.
Gordon, A Survey of Child Psychiatry (London:
Oxford University Press, 1939), 115–27, 126.
46Crossley, Contesting Psychiatry, 94, 97.
47Kenneth Soddy, speech on ‘Contributing Factors’ at
NAMH, The Maladjusted Child—The Underwood
Report and After: Proceedings of a Conference at
Church House, Westminster, London on 11th and
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But Soddy did not disavow this caricature. In fact he remarked, ‘Now I happen to believe
that so firmly that I have pleasure in passing it on to you today.’ The root of the caricature
and of Soddy’s refusal to distance himself from it, was the mental hygienist concern with
‘emotional security’ as the central factor of satisfactory mental adjustment from infancy.
Modern parents needed to recognise that their authority, in its manifestation as care and
discipline, must be tailored to the child’s individuality and its need to pass successfully
through maturational stages. Parents must listen to emotionality in terms of the develop-
mental stages that it displayed, and tailor their authority accordingly. Behavioural issues
were often ascribed, by mental hygienists, to emotionally insensitive relationships, and
understood as inappropriate but emotionally communicative responses. A rationally mar-
shalled and emotionally integrated individual could only satisfactorily develop if the child
experienced emotionally secure relationships in the family. So, for example, as the psy-
choanalyst Mary Barkas put it in 1932, ‘With this emotional relationship and arising from
it comes the dawning of a sense of guilt, and it depends largely upon the adult whether
this relationship is wisely or unwisely utilised’.48 And as the psychiatrist Denis Martin put
it in the 1960s, ‘the emotional security of the child in terms of being consistently loved,
accepted and allowed to grow seems to be the crucial factor’.49
There is an emphasis on cognitive development in this characterisation that is impor-
tant. Mental hygienists had drawn a line of distinction marking off those people consid-
ered constitutionally unable to benefit properly from this intimate and receptive family
environment.50 The basis from which the concern for emotional security had developed
was a belief in progress, understood as the twin development of societies and of individ-
ual minds. People designated mentally deficient were considered the failures of this pro-
cess, for them a mental deficiency system had been constructed that used different
conceptions of care and control.
Outside of the mental deficiency system, however, the mental hygienist concentration
on ‘emotional security’ provoked a cluster of responses that acted both to undermine
the foundations of the mental hygiene strategy, and inform the emergence of the rights
approach of MIND. A concise way into the issues is to look at the mental hygiene move-
ment’s response to the Curtis Committee on the Care of Children Deprived of a Normal
12th April, 1957 (London: NAMH, 1957), 23–39, 28.
SA/MIN/B/80/43/2.
48Mary R. Barkas, ‘Guilt’, Mental Hygiene, 1932, 29–
33. SA/MIN/B/80/30.
49Denis Martin, ‘The Problem Stated’ in The Role of
Religion in Mental Health: Conference Papers
(London: NAMH, 1967), 7–16, 8. SA/MIN/B/80/43/5.
50See Jonathan Toms, ‘Mind the Gap: MIND, the
Mental Hygiene Movement and the Trapdoor in
Measurements of Intellect’, Journal of Intellectual
Disability Research, 2010, 54, Supp. 1, 16–27. Rare
exceptions to this view appear to have existed within
and around the mental hygiene movement.
One, printed in the CAMW’s Mental Welfare is
Isabel M. Laird, ‘Some Psychological Problems in
“Institutionalising” Defectives’, Mental Welfare,
1938, 19, 1–6. Laird, a psychologist at the Royal
Scottish National Institution, Larbert, criticised the
complete lack of emotionally satisfying relationships
with adults available to children sent to mental defi-
ciency institutions. Louise Westwood has described
how Helen Boyle, a founder of the NCMH, endorsed
the ideals of the Brighton Guardianship Society
which resisted ascertainment and segregation in fa-
vour of guardianship and foster care in families. See
Louise Westwood, ‘A Quiet Revolution in Brighton:
Dr Helen Boyle’s Pioneering Approach to Mental
Health Care, 1899–1939’, Social History of Medicine,
2001, 14, 439–57. Nevertheless, the NCMH annual
reports for 1932–36 show that it continued to en-
courage institutionalisation. SA/MIN/B/8O/55.
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Home. This was set up by the government in 1945 in response to concerns about child-
ren’s institutional care largely raised by the wartime evacuation.
Early in the war the CAMW, NCMH and CGC, had integrated their work and become
involved in the evacuation measures. They set up a nationally coordinated scheme to
oversee social and psychological issues. Working with central and local government, they
helped organise and provide advice for wartime hostels, residential nurseries and already
existing Public Assistance Homes. On the basis of this work they compiled a memoran-
dum of evidence to the Curtis Committee.51
This report made clear that the aim of all childcare must be to enable the child to
achieve a healthy maturity. In accordance with all mental hygienist child care theorising,
it maintained that any upbringing outside the biological family was necessarily handicap-
ping to the child. It therefore recommended that all institutional settings must aim to
compensate for this as much as possible. A child should be provided with a close, contin-
uous and trusting relationship with a caring adult. Day to day life should be in small
groups of mixed ages, with the opportunity for freedom and diversity in occupations,
possessions and leisure.
The promotion of these principles was accompanied by a critique of prevailing institu-
tional provision for children. The report exposed the fact that life in large groups pro-
moted disturbances in development and mental health ranging from bed-wetting, to
emotional disturbance and anti-social behaviour. Hospital-like regimes were criticised for
their over-concern with personal hygiene, cleanliness and efficiency, as well as an exces-
sive requirement for order and control. Most regimes were considered insensitive to the
needs of children’s emotional development, thus distorting them and creating maladjust-
ment. The report maintained that ‘culture is not imposed by lessons . . . but by the feelers
a child puts out to draw them into himself’. ‘Children, like adults’, it remarked, ‘need to
be able to reject or turn down what is offered them.’ Staff’s sensitivity to the dynamics of
children’s emotional lives therefore came under scrutiny. They should avoid arbitrary au-
thority or placing an exaggerated importance on their position. There was an implicit
concern here to diminish differentials in status between children and staff, and also to
some extent between staff themselves. The centre of practice was to be an appreciation
of children’s on-going need for affection and emotional security. The report stated
bluntly that it was only children who had become passively conforming and isolated from
secure emotional relationships who appeared to accept typical institutional life.
The mental hygiene movement did not, however, consider the principles outlined in
this report to be relevant to mentally deficient children in institutions. However, during
the early 1950s psychologists later associated with NAMH began research that applied
mental hygienist ideas on emotional development and institutionalisation to detained
mentally deficient people who were categorised ‘feebleminded’.52 Crossley’s schema
suggests that the intrusion of a civil rights discourse, through the campaigning of the
51This was subsequently published by NAMH: Ruth
Thomas, Children Without Homes: How Can They Be
Compensated for Loss of Family Life? (London:
NAMH, 1946).
52H. C. Gunzburg, ‘The Colony and the High-Grade
Mental Defective’, Mental Health, 1950, 9, 87–92.
SA/MIN/B/80/27/10; A. D. B. Clarke and A. M.
Clarke, ‘A Rehabilitation Scheme for Certified Mental
Defectives’, Mental Health, 1954, 14, 4–10. SA/MIN/
B/80/27/14.
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NCCL over the mental deficiency system in the early 1950s, created ‘strain’ in the mental
health field. This appears to have been one consequence. The research had marginal im-
pact at this time, but it nevertheless highlights the interactional nature of SMOs that
Crossley emphasised. In fact, although he noted that NAMH’s public response to NCCL
campaigning was hostile, it shows that beneath the surface deeper engagements were
taking place.53 The psychologist Jack Tizard went further in implicitly challenging the
mental hygienist psychotherapeutically inspired principles of child development, in what
became known as the Brooklands experiment, carried out at the end of the 1950s. He,
and his colleagues, applied to children termed ‘imbecile’ the principles of childcare that
the Curtis Committee had made the foundations of post-war policy for other looked-
after children.54 While NAMH’s response to the work was inhibited by its conceptualisa-
tion of ‘mental deficiency’, Tizard and his colleagues extended the research through the
1960s, including community homes for severely handicapped children and adults. It
should be noted here that the National Society for Mental Handicapped Children spon-
sored Brooklands and other initiatives.55 Crossley does not address this SMO, or others
such as the Spastics Society and the National Autistic Society, presumably because they
do not appear to be directly related to mental health and mental illness. However, all of
these groups impacted on both NAMH and the wider psychiatric field.
In any case, the fundamental issues that informed NAMH’s psychotherapeutically in-
spired principles regarding ‘normal’ child development also informed mental hygienist
ideas regarding residential care and treatment for children and young adults already
diagnosed ‘emotionally maladjusted’.56 Their maladjustment was considered to be
largely a product of earlier inappropriate authority relations of care and discipline.
Emotional security had been lacking. Consequently their emotional development had
been warped and retarded. Therefore these young people were often considered by
mental hygienists to require greater toleration and freedom than normal because their
relationship with authority had already become distorted and antagonistic. They needed
the freedom to ‘regress’ and ‘work through’ these distorted stages of development.
Although the shared principles with NAMH’s report on institutional care for other chil-
dren were more radically interpreted regarding residential treatment for ‘maladjusted’
children, they can nevertheless be summarised: The child’s experience is, in principle,
considered to be central in deciding whether personal relationships and institutional
provision are acceptable.57 Freedom and choice are not seen as the products of training,
discipline or treatment. They are intrinsic elements of psychological growth, adjustment
and mental health. Rigid hierarchy, regimentation, insensitive authority, and unreflective
53See Toms, Mental Hygiene and Psychiatry, 120–25,
130–1.
54Jack Tizard, Community Services for the Mentally
Handicapped (London: Oxford University Press,
1964); NAMH, ‘Hospitals—or Family Groups?’, in
‘News and Notes’, Mental Health, 1960, 19, 104.
SA/MIN/B/80/27/19.
55See Toms, ‘Citizenship and Learning Disabled People:
The Mental Health Charity MIND’s Campaign in
Historical Context’, Medical History, 2017, 61, 481–99.
56See, for example, M. W. Hamilton, ‘The Treatment
of Children in Hostels’, Report of Child Guidance
Inter-Clinic Conference, 16th November 1946
(London: NAMH, 1946), 24–9. SA/MIN/B/80/54.
57I say ‘in principle’ because there remained a tension
between listening to a child’s own expression of its
experiences and the interpretation of what a child
was expressing based on various signs and symp-
toms. There was nevertheless a clear shift towards
more open listening and collaborative living.
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staff attitudes are considered detrimental to emotional well-being and development.
There is an emphasis on promoting open communication. Mental health does not
emerge through doing things to passive or reluctant young people.
The mental hygiene movement favoured and indeed sponsored the concept of self-
governing communities as particularly applicable to the young people they considered
emotionally maladjusted.58 As early as the 1920s and 1930s, the mental hygiene move-
ment had supported experiments with self-governing communities. In 1924 an experi-
ment at the Leytonstone Poor Law Homes for Children had significant input from
members of the Tavistock Clinic. In the 1930s mental hygienists had also been closely in-
volved with a self-governing community experiment in Essex.59 Mental hygienists’ in-
volvement here resulted in later support for the development of the therapeutic
community concept. This included the famous Second World War experiment at
Northfield hospital for military psychiatric casualties under the auspices of J. R. Rees, the
head of the Tavistock Clinic and his ‘Tavi Brigadiers’.60 It also included attempts to reform
and rejuvenate mental hospitals in the 1950s and 1960s.61 Among the latter were T. P.
Rees’ influential advocacy of the concept of the therapeutic community at Warlingham
Park Hospital, and D. H. Clark’s equally influential development of the concept at
Fulbourn. These psychiatrists were closely involved with NAMH, as was Russell Barton,
whose concept of ‘institutional neurosis’ had an associated impact.62
The extension of such approaches, from children and young people to adults, mirrors
the way in which the psychotherapeutic principles on which they were based penetrated
throughout all mental hygienist areas of activity. Through the prioritisation of emotional-
ity and its relational components it became a commonplace among post-war mental
hygienists that a core feature of all mental disorders was a failure to sustain human rela-
tionships.63 Not only did this call into question environments based on hospital-like
regimes for physical illness, it also disrupted those medical models of mental illness that
considered it only as an internal disease process.
In child guidance this concentration on emotionality and its relational aspects had par-
adoxical effects. It was common for interwar mental hygienists in child guidance to attrib-
ute maladjustments in children to the faulty behaviour of parents.64 But the subtle shift
58NAMH, Committee on Maladjusted Children:
Memorandum Submitted by the National Association
for Mental Health, 1952, 11. Robina Addis Archive,
Wellcome Trust PP/ADD/J/15/1.
59See Jonathan Toms, Mental Hygiene and Psychiatry
in Modern Britain (London: Palgrave MacMillan,
2013), ch. 4, 53–83.
60Ibid., ch. 5, 84–103. Also, Tom Harrison, Bion,
Rickman, Foulkes and the Northfield Experiments:
Advancing on a Different Front (London: Jessica
Kingsley, 2000), ch. 5, 152–81.
61See Toms, Mental Hygiene and Psychiatry, ch. 7,
137–71.
62Recent historical work has usefully examined connec-
tions between the development of therapeutic commu-
nity experiments and anti-psychiatry. However, they do
not connect these with the mental hygiene movement.
See, Oisı´n Wall, ‘The Birth and Death of Villa 21’,
History of Psychiatry 2013, 24, 326–40; Catherine
Fussinger, ‘“Therapeutic Community”, Psychiatry’s
Reformers and Anti-Psychiatrists: Reconsidering
Changes in the Field of Psychiatry after World War
Two’, History of Psychiatry, 2011, 22, 146–63.
63H. V. Dicks, ‘Strains Within the Family’, NAMH, Strain
and Stress in Modern Living: Special Opportunities
and Responsibilities of Public Authorities:
Proceedings of a Conference Held at Friends House,
London, N.W.1, 25th to 26th March, 1954 (London:
NAMH, 1954), 28–37, 28. SA/MIN/B/80/43/1; T. P.
Rees, ‘Back to Moral Treatment and Community
Care’, Journal of Mental Science, 1957, 103, 431,
303–313. Similar thinking is alluded to in, NAMH,
Questions on Our Minds [booklet], 2nd edn (London:
NAMH, 1966), 5.
64For example, Gillespie, ‘Mental Hygiene as a National
Problem’, 9.
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that child guidance signalled, from an overtly moral terminology of correct discipline and
training to such medical terminology as patient, diagnosis and treatment, paradoxically
entailed a disruption of the straightforward designation of ‘the patient’. This increasingly
became understood in terms of maladjustments of the family being ‘projected’ or
‘funnelled’ into the child. This same style of thinking, with its emphasis on ‘projection’
and funnelling’ of symptoms within a relational milieu, became a classic of therapeutic
community theorising, and later of anti-psychiatry.
In associated fashion, psychiatric social workers argued that diagnosis and treatment
could not in fact be separated.65 Others, such as the psychiatrist Jack Kahn, emphasised
that diagnostic concepts and pathogenicity were of a relative nature.66 Others simply
placed less attention on diagnosis. At a NAMH hostel run on self-governing lines, clinical
descriptions were considered ‘meaningless for practical purposes’.67 Meanwhile, psychia-
trists and social workers associated with an early mental hygiene community treatment
scheme that included significant numbers of people previously diagnosed psychotic or
mentally deficient, maintained that this type of therapeutic approach must resist dealing
with people as ‘types’.68 These attitudes were often associated with a concern to avoid
relationships that were considered authoritarian and therefore anti-therapeutic.69
The psychiatrist Martin James, for example, who served on NAMH’s consultant medical
panel throughout the 1950s, summed up the 1965 Child Guidance Inter-Clinic
Conference by voicing such concerns. He felt that psychologists and doctors were trained
to see people as machines, which desensitised them to emotionality, but social workers’
training enhanced sensitivity and therefore avoided authoritarian interventions.70
So the principles of care and treatment, founded around the importance of emotional
security, associated mental health with the attainment and sustainment of emotionally
literate inter-personal relationships. At its heart this contained scepticism towards author-
ity commands and relationships. From this, there developed a critique of prevailing insti-
tutional provision, and destabilisation of a medical model based on physical illness.
Freedom and choice became increasingly considered part of the means of therapy and
not just its intended result. Associated consequences were an emphasis on more open
communication, a blurring of the distinction between the pathological and the normal,
misgivings about the relevance and impact of diagnostic labels, and some questioning of
professional roles and training.
These principles and associated effects are evident across the areas of mental hygienist
activity. They served to weaken the movement’s conceptual foundations. But their ex-
pression was uneven, and often inconsistent and superficial. This was largely due to the
fact that they were in contradiction with the movement’s overall agenda. Under this
65Noel K. Hunnybun and Lydia Jacobs, Interviews with
Parents in a Child Guidance Clinic (London: APSW,
1946), 4.
66J. H. Kahn, ‘A Wider Concept of Deprivation’, in
Clinical Problems in Children of Primary School Age:
The Proceedings of the 19th Child Guidance Inter-
Clinic Conference (London: NAMH, 1963), 5–16, at
7–8. SA/MIN/B/64.
67David Wills, Reynolds House: A Report of the First
Five Years (London: NAMH, 1969), 36.
68T. A. Ratcliffe and E. V. Jones, ‘Intensive Casework in
a Community Setting’, Case Conference, 1956, 2,
17–23, at 18.
69NAMH, ‘Memorandum Prepared for the Working
Party on Social Workers’, 1956, para. 24. SA/MIN/B/
118.
70Martin James, ‘Summing Up’, Child Guidance:
Function and Social Role: Report of the 21st Child
Guidance Inter-Clinic Conference, 1965 (London:
NAMH, 1965), 51–2. SA/MIN/B/64.
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agenda, mental health was equated with the notion of a rationally marshalled individual,
imbued through adequate intellectual capacity and appropriate familial authority rela-
tions, with a stable internal authority that readily acquiesced in the authority relations
necessary to the community’s balance and progress. An emphasis was placed on differ-
entiation of status and function according to mental ability and the integration of person-
ality. Behaviours associated with ‘social problems’ were largely related to intellectual
incapacities or failures of adequate emotional development consequent of inappropriate
familial authority relations. Consequently, social, economic and political inequalities were
subordinated under this rendition of individual and social ‘mental health’, and indeed of-
ten attributed to the same individual and familial issues.
Mental Hygiene, Anti-Psychiatry and MIND’s Critique of Psychiatry
For Crossley, the anti-psychiatry movement that emerged in the 1960s set in train a
‘paradigm shift in the wider campaigning culture’. The mental hygiene discourse
appeared outmoded. NAMH could not shift its stance to the extent of adopting the radi-
cal agenda of anti-psychiatry. Instead it became a ‘representative of the civil rights move-
ment/discourse’.71 However, I believe that the relevance of anti-psychiatry to MIND is
thrown into a new light once placed alongside the mental hygiene agenda and the
‘discursive transformation’ I have described. The mental hygienist agenda was paradig-
matic of the ‘psychiatricisation of social problems’ described by Pearson, and its general
equation of ‘adjustment’ with mental health a clear target of anti-psychiatry’s ‘politics of
socialisation’. As Pearson noted:
When medicine inserts itself into an understanding of social disorder, as it does in
the medical model of deviance, it expresses an ideology of social order as a natural
phenomenon. Conformity—rather than being viewed as a social accomplish-
ment—is elevated to the status of ‘health’.72
But, as I have argued, influential therapeutic principles developed under the mental
hygiene movement constituted a ‘discursive transformation’ of the contents of care and
treatment. These principles are clearly echoed by anti-psychiatry: the emphasis on free-
dom and choice as part of the means of therapy, the associated attention to ‘open
communication’, reduction of rigid hierarchy and regimentation, the denouncing of
unreflective staff attitudes, the blurring of distinctions between the pathological and nor-
mal, and misgivings about the impact of diagnostic labels.
Yet their emergence under mental hygiene is distinct from anti-psychiatry. Indeed,
given that anti-psychiatry revolted against the insertion of the ‘medical model’ into ‘social
problems’ it is paradoxical that it was this very intrusion of medical terminology into child
guidance which placed the straightforward medical designation of the ‘patient’ in doubt,
and along with it the traditional medical understanding of diagnosis.
The discursive transformation that emerged under the mental hygiene movement was
in contradiction with the movement’s overall agenda, and weakened its conceptual foun-
dations. In combination with the pressures of anti-psychiatry and wider elements of social
critique it contributed to the mental hygiene movement’s collapse. But I show now how
71Crossley, Contesting Psychiatry, 95. 72Pearson, Deviant Imagination, 48.
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the principles of care and treatment that had emerged were continued and extended
in an unstable incorporation under MIND. While there were clearly affinities with
anti-psychiatry, I show their distinctiveness by highlighting how MIND incorporated and
radicalised these principles regarding people then termed ‘mentally handicapped’ (previ-
ously ‘mentally deficient’). This is significant because anti-psychiatry paid little attention
to ‘mental handicap’.
MIND’s activity under the directorship of Tony Smythe, the ex-head of the National
Council for Civil Liberties, has been commonly depicted as a radical break with the organ-
ization’s history through the adoption of a civil rights discourse.73 As I have noted, anti-
psychiatry was highlighted as an important influence. MIND’s approach has generally
been characterised as framing the treatment of mentally ill people in terms of the depri-
vation of liberty.74 It has also been portrayed as asserting an associated ‘right to be differ-
ent’ outside of psychiatric control or coercion.75
One clear way into this is by looking at MIND’s 1978 written evidence to the Minister
of State for Education and Science on corporal punishment in schools. Written by the
psychiatrist Anthony Whitehead and Maurice Rosen, a general practitioner, this began in
classic civil libertarian fashion: ‘Everyone has been protected against assault and battery
by the state, except the child attending school.’76 But its opposition to corporal punish-
ment displays precisely the therapeutic principles that we have seen informed the mental
hygiene movement. ‘All children need love and security’ it emphasised. This should ide-
ally come from the child’s parents or substitute parent figures.77 But, since children spent
such a large part of the week at school, teachers were inevitably an extension of the
home and their attitudes significantly affected children. MIND’s evidence noted that cor-
poral punishment was applied for various reasons but especially disobedience, insolence
or aggression. It argued that children who behaved in these ways had not ‘developed ef-
fective control over their impulses’. They came mainly, it considered, from homes ‘with
little love and security’. The children were left feeling un-loved and rejected. They often
responded with a ‘swaggering independence’ expressed in anger, aggression and ‘lack
of concern for others’, or a ‘passive submission to authority’. Children from loving
homes, it argued, had in contrast learned to ‘control their anger and use it construc-
tively.78 Given these facts, the memorandum argued, it was vital that the teacher either
adopted the parent’s loving role or compensated in some way for those parents who
didn’t do this. At school, MIND argued, the, ‘intelligent, healthy, well-adjusted, attractive
child tends to receive recognition, but in contrast the intellectually slow, emotionally de-
prived, or disturbed child gets little, if any, in spite of his or her greater need’.79
Clearly MIND’s rights approach did not simply dismiss issues of socialisation in the
name of a straightforward civil libertarian call for protection from assault. Clearly, as
73 For example, Kathleen Jones, Asylums and After: A
Revised History of the Mental Health Services: From
the Early 18th Century to the 1990’s (London: The
Athlone Press, 1993); Clive Unsworth, The Politics of
Mental Health Legislation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987).
74 For instance, Kathleen Jones; Asylums and After,
203; Nikolas Rose, ‘Unreasonable Rights: Mental
Illness and the Limits of the Law’, 202–4.
75Nikolas Rose, ‘Law, Rights and Psychiatry’, 199.
76MIND, ‘MIND’s Evidence on Corporal Punishment in
Schools’, 1978, 1–2, 1. SA/MIN/B/80/10.
77Ibid., 1.
78Ibid., 1.
79Ibid., 2.
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well, the mental hygiene movement had founded its agenda on just such a view of the
family’s personal relations. It had highlighted the need for authority to be tailored to the
need for emotional security. And the same polar maladjustments had been posited: pas-
sive submission to authority or rebellion against all authority. MIND’s rendition here how-
ever is not only of these psychotherapeutic principles as they had become ‘radicalised’ at
the level of care and therapy, but also a connection and extension of them with wider so-
cial critique. This had the effect of splitting off the discourse of emotionality from the
mental hygienist agenda from which it had largely emerged.
For example, MIND promoted a concept of social justice that took the mental hygienist
association of delinquency with the working classes and inverted the reduction of it to
family disturbances. Family problems were now seen to be exacerbated by social and
economic inequalities and welfare approaches that ignored these factors.80 In its evi-
dence to the Select Committee on Expenditure Examining, the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969 MIND criticised the ‘treatment’ model in childcare and social welfare. It
remarked that, ‘Treatment implies the presence of an illness but there is no evidence gen-
erally available to suggest that the overwhelming majority of deprived or delinquent chil-
dren are ill’.81 This was a rejection of the psychodynamic underpinnings of the casework
approach that dominated social work and of the assumption that a consensus existed,
characterised by social participation and citizenship, against which ‘social problems’
could be reduced to individual failures of intellectual capacity or faulty familial authority
relations leading to individual ‘maladjustments’.
MIND argued that the 1969 Act confused ‘care’ and ‘control’. It criticised the combina-
tion of treatment or education with incarceration and punishment, and considered it to
be a form of ‘“double think” . . . detrimental to mental health and to civil liberties’.82
However, MIND’s characterisation of some of these detrimental effects is instructive:
they reinforced children’s ‘feelings of failure, difference and defiance’. The same princi-
ples, that is, which informed its evidence regarding corporal punishment in schools, and
which display a strong line of continuity with the psychotherapeutic principles of care
and therapy established by the mental hygiene movement.
Indeed MIND was adamant that committal to care rarely promoted either the personal
interests or the mental health of children. It closed most of its residential homes. One of
the few it retained, MIND’s director Tony Smythe considered to be an ‘exceptionally
good school for highly emotionally disturbed young children’. This had opened in 1969
under NAMH. It operated as a therapeutic community, drawing explicit influence from
pioneering work associated with the mental hygiene movement. MIND continued to sup-
port, and promote, the therapeutic community concept during the 1970s and 1980s.
Concern over the care of people termed ‘mentally handicapped’ (previously ‘mentally
deficient’) was a strong component of MIND’s campaigning. This is important in terms of
the impact of anti-psychiatry, since it paid scant attention to ‘mental handicap’. Here
again, the ‘discursive transformation’ that I have described fed into MIND’s approach. In
80John Barter, ‘Children at Risk’, MIND OUT, 1975, 9,
6–7; MIND, ‘Children in Trouble’, MIND OUT, 1975,
9, 4–6, at 6. SA/MIN/B/80/36/1.
81MIND, ‘MIND’s Evidence to the Select Committee on
Expenditure Examining the Working of the Children
and Young Persons Act 1969’, 1975, 1–10, at 8. SA/
MIN/B/80/10.
82Ibid., 7.
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1970, at the beginning of its turn to promoting the rights of patients, NAMH had drawn
attention to the plight of children in mental handicap hospitals and, for the first time, ex-
plicitly drawn attention to the fact that the principles of childcare promoted under the
mental hygiene movement had not been applied in mental handicap hospitals.83 MIND’s
campaigning for people termed mentally handicapped forcefully advocated the kinds of
approaches to residential provision proposed by Jack Tizard, along with his colleagues
Norma Raynes and Roy King, and put into practice with Albert Kushlick’s work at
Wessex.84 These were partly legitimated by reference to Russell Barton, who had applied
his notion of ‘institutional neurosis’ to mental handicap hospitals.85 The effects of institu-
tional provision, such as, ‘block treatment’, ‘social distance’ and ‘depersonalization’, ac-
companied as they were with a lack of continuity of care and hierarchical authority,
continued to be stressed as detrimental to mental health and development.86 When
Albert Kushlick’s research unit came under funding threat, MIND publicly defended the
importance of its work.87
People termed mentally handicapped were no longer a race apart with primitive
requirements needing accordingly unsophisticated training and care. The dynamics of
emotional experience in learning and living were to be central to the education of both
staff and clients. Until recently, it had been only mentally handicapped people themselves
who had been deemed to need training in socialization so that they could ‘give’ as well
as ‘take’ in human relationships.88 But now this was reflected back upon the staff.
Carers were to be trained in being emotionally sensitive to the inter-personal dynamics
with clients and reflect on their own place in these dynamics.89
Fully funded community provision was sought by MIND as part of the means of social
integration, participation and citizenship.90 MIND emphasised that community provisions
must avoid setting up ‘mini-institutions’. Hostels should be ‘homely’ and integrated with
the general community.91 Its 1976 ‘Home from Hospital’ campaign emphasised the need
for integrated community care sustaining supportive human relationships. This was not
an assertion of a ‘right to be different’ outside of any psychiatric system. On the contrary,
in its report Co-ordination or Chaos?, MIND accused the government of denying the real-
ity of mental illness.
83NAMH, Annual Report 1969–70, 4–5. SA/MIN/B/80/
7/2.
84MIND, Editorial, ‘The Issues of Mental Handicap’,
MIND OUT, 1978, 28, 2. SA/MIN/B/80/36/2; Lindsay
Knight, ‘Better Services in Wessex?’, MIND OUT,
1978, 28, 6–8, 6. SA/MIN/B/80/36/2.
85Russell Barton, ‘The Institutional Mind and the
Subnormal Mind’ in, H. C. Gunzburg, ed., Advances
in the Care of the Mentally Handicapped
(Birmingham: BSSMH, 1973), 13–20.
86Lindasy Knight, ‘Better Services’, 7.
87‘Wessex Research Unit Threatened with Closure’,
MIND OUT, 1981, 45, 4; ‘Threat to Wessex Research
Unit Postponed’, MIND OUT, 1981, 46, 4. SA/MIN/B/
80/3.
88H. C. Gunzburg, Junior Training Centres: An Outline
of the Principles and Practices of Social Education
and Training of the Mentally Subnormal Child
(London: NAMH, 1963) [reprinted 1966], 10.
89MIND, The Mental Handicap Component in Social
Work Training: A Handbook for Tutors and Training
Officers: Report of a MIND Working Party (London:
MIND, May 1977), 18 (and throughout); Ann
Shearer, ‘Institutions Don’t Have to Be Bad’, MIND
OUT, 1981, 50, 11–13, 13. SA/MIN/B/80/3.
90Larry O. Gostin, A Human Condition: The Mental
Health Act from 1959–1975, Observations, Analysis
and Proposals for Reform (London: MIND, 1975),
13–14; MIND, Services for Mentally Handicapped
People: MIND’s Evidence to the Royal Commission on
the National Health Service (London: MIND, 1977).
91Alison Wertheimer, ‘Co-ordination or Chaos—The
Rundown of Psychiatric Hosptials’, Royal Society of
Health Journal, 1975, 95, 3, 136–8, 137–8.
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Conclusion
It is the issue of authority and its relation to mental health and therapy that substantially
informed MIND’s continuities with the mental hygiene movement and its break with it.
The mental hygienist psychotherapeutic examination of authority and reinterpretation of
it in relation to mental health resulted in a ‘discursive transformation’ that was in contra-
diction with the movement’s overall programme. This transformation did not simply es-
tablish a new relation between authority and those subject to it. It placed an emphasis
on tailoring authority commands and relations to a perceived need for emotional security
and self-expression, in the interests of mental health. This engendered an emphasis on
greater freedom and egalitarian relations in care and therapy. Along with a suspicion
of doing things to and for reluctant or passive people, this encouraged critiques of
institutional care and the prevailing medical model, along with calls for more open
communication.
While there are affinities with anti-psychiatry, this discursive transformation in the
principles of care and treatment is recognisably distinct. Crossley is surely right that anti-
psychiatry was too radical to be adopted by NAMH when the programme of mental
hygiene as a movement began to fall apart. But given Crossley’s valuable representation
of the interactional and processual nature of SMOs, it is ironic that this view implies only
a set of binary choices for NAMH: civil rights or the ‘too radical’ anti-psychiatry.
Crossley’s terminology of discursive formation and transformation in fact allows for the
kind of examination of mental hygiene that I have presented here. An appreciation of
this transformation allows for a more nuanced picture of the relevance of anti-psychiatry
to be constructed.
MIND’s approach was not some simple attempt to posit individual liberty against psy-
chiatric control and coercion, nor was it a straight-forward civil rights call for protection
from assault. Important strands of its approach were consistent with the discursive trans-
formation I have described. Under MIND, the principles of this discourse were taken up
and brought together in unstable coalition with wider elements of social critique. The
mental hygienist association of ‘social problems’, such as ‘industrial unrest’, delinquency
or truancy, with the working classes—and its reduction of them to disturbances within
the family—was thrown off. So too, was its hierarchical societal image associated with
intellectual capacity and emotional ‘maturity’. Social problems were now more closely
related to social, economic and civil inequalities, and welfare services that disregarded
these factors. Freedom and choice were no longer considered simply the aimed for
results of treatment. Nor were they now to be retained at the level of therapeutic
technologies. They were intrinsic elements of the development of mental health and its
maintenance in a much wider sense. Such an unstable coalition could not last. But, no
doubt, the interactions and processes of its demise are equally complex.
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